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The	emergence	of	a	novel	strain	of	influenza	virus	A	
(H1N1)	in	April	2009	focused	attention	on	influenza	surveil-
lance  capabilities  worldwide.  In  consultations  before  the 
2009	outbreak	of	influenza	subtype	H1N1,	the	World	Health	
Organization had concluded that the world was unprepared 
to	respond	to	an	influenza	pandemic,	due	in	part	to	inad-
equate global surveillance and response capacity. We de-
scribe a sentinel surveillance system that could enhance 
the	quality	of	influenza	epidemiologic	and	laboratory	data	
and  strengthen  a  country’s  capacity  for  seasonal,  novel, 
and	pandemic	influenza	detection	and	prevention.	Such	a	
system would 1) provide data for a better understanding of 
the	epidemiology	and	extent	of	seasonal	influenza,	2)	pro-
vide a platform for the study of other acute febrile respira-
tory illnesses, 3) provide virus isolates for the development 
of vaccines, 4) inform local pandemic planning and vaccine 
policy,	5)	monitor	influenza	epidemics	and	pandemics,	and	
6) provide infrastructure for an early warning system for out-
breaks of new virus subtypes.
T
he emergence of a novel strain of influenza virus A 
(H1N1) in April 2009 and its subsequent rapid global 
spread  have  focused  attention  on  influenza  surveillance 
capabilities  worldwide  (1).  A  consultation  convened  by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2005 had previ-
ously concluded that the world was unprepared to respond 
to an influenza pandemic, due in part to inadequate global 
surveillance and response capacity (2). The International 
Health Regulations 2005 call for strengthened surveillance 
for all events that may constitute a “public health emer-
gency of international concern”; such events include indi-
vidual human cases of influenza caused by a new subtype 
of influenza virus A (3). As part of the International Health 
Regulations 2005 core surveillance and response capacity 
requirements, each Member State must develop and main-
tain capabilities to detect, assess, and report disease events 
nationally  and  internationally  to  WHO  within  48  hours 
of confirmation. However, reviews of national pandemic 
planning indicate that surveillance systems are often in-
adequate to support current preparedness strategies (4–8). 
WHO has existing surveillance guidelines to help Member 
States implement universal surveillance for novel and pan-
demic influenza (9), but the guidelines lack the specificity 
that would enable many countries to establish operational 
surveillance plans.
Quality influenza surveillance systems are needed to 
enable countries to better understand influenza epidemi-
ology, including disease incidence and severity, and help 
them  implement  appropriate  prevention  strategies.  The 
challenges experienced by the United States and Mexico to 
rapidly determine the extent and severity of illness of the 
2009 novel influenza A (H1N1) outbreak highlighted the 
need for systems that can reliably produce these estimates. 
Furthermore, global strategies to address other vaccine-pre-
ventable diseases have acknowledged the importance of es-
tablishing local disease burden (effects, severity, amount of 
illness, and costs) as a first step toward decisions about the 
introduction of vaccines into new countries. We describe 
a generic guideline for collecting data on severe acute re-
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spiratory infection (SARI), influenza-like illness (ILI), and 
laboratory-confirmed influenza that can be implemented in 
limited-resource settings.
Current Situation
Global Influenza Surveillance
For 60 years, the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance 
Network (GISN) has provided virologic information used 
in the biannual process of selecting strains for the Northern 
and Southern Hemisphere influenza vaccine formulations. 
However, its capacity to provide epidemiologic data or an 
alert of an emerging pandemic is limited. GISN currently 
comprises 122 National Influenza Centers in 87 countries 
and 4 WHO Collaborating Centers for Reference and Re-
search on Influenza (10). Although this system has proven 
to be valuable, tropical and resource-limited countries (par-
ticularly in Africa) are underrepresented (11).
Influenza in Developing Countries
Virus  transmission  or  clinical  presentation  may  be 
altered by differences in cultural practices, the environ-
ment, geography, human genetics, and social structures. 
Enhanced influenza surveillance can permit assessment of 
a number of factors that may affect disease activity: popu-
lation density, differences in prevalence and spectrum of 
chronic illness, proximity of the young and elderly, low 
proportion of elderly in the population, low school atten-
dance, and school schedules that may not correspond with 
peak transmissibility season. The effectiveness of control 
measures such as social distancing and vaccination may 
differ between developed and developing settings because 
of these factors.
Available epidemiologic evidence suggests that influ-
enza is common in tropical regions and contributes substan-
tially to disability and use of healthcare resources (12–16). 
Data describing the seasonality and epidemiology of influ-
enza in tropical areas are limited; however, some tropical 
countries report year-round human influenza activity (12), 
unlike in temperate regions where transmission occurs with 
marked  seasonality.  Because  of  these  limited  data,  most 
of the understanding of seasonal influenza is derived from 
epidemiologic data collected in western Europe and North 
America. Nevertheless, estimates of a pandemic impact indi-
cate that most deaths will be in developing countries and that 
more than half will occur in southern Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa (17). A better understanding of the epidemiology of 
influenza in these areas would facilitate country-appropriate 
pandemic planning and vaccine policy development.
Objectives
The most efficient process for producing high-quality 
epidemiologic data for influenza-associated illness is sen-
tinel surveillance. The primary limitation of most existing 
influenza sentinel-site networks that track ILIs has been 
that they often provide little epidemiologic data, do not 
produce data on disease incidence, and are focused on mild 
disease, which supports the notion that influenza is a benign 
disease. We propose that influenza surveillance should cap-
ture severe influenza outcomes as a primary measure. Hos-
pital-based sentinel surveillance is the most efficient way to 
collect clinical data and laboratory specimens from persons 
with a prevalent and severe infectious disease.
Carefully placed sentinel sites can provide adequate 
information on the epidemiology of influenza without the 
need for comprehensive national case ascertainment or re-
porting. Placing surveillance sites where population data 
are known would permit calculation of population-based 
estimates of disease rates according to age and other demo-
graphic variables. In addition, collection of clinical speci-
mens from persons from whom epidemiologic data are also 
collected would ensure virus strain surveillance and pro-
vide isolates that can be used for vaccine development. 
A sentinel surveillance system can be used to monitor 
>1 disease, can be sustainable, and can integrate with and 
build upon existing systems. The system objectives are 1) 
describe the disease impact and epidemiology of severe, 
acute, febrile respiratory illness and define the proportion 
that is associated with influenza; 2) provide influenza vi-
rus isolates for monitoring changes in viral antigens and 
development of new vaccines; 3) contribute data for local 
pandemic planning and making decisions regarding vac-
cine policy; 4) provide infrastructure for an early warning 
system for outbreaks of new subtypes of influenza A vi-
ruses and new strains of existing subtypes; and 5) serve as 
a monitoring tool for pandemic influenza.
Components and Processes
Case Definitions
These surveillance guidelines use the existing WHO 
case definition for ILI and incorporate WHO guidance to 
define SARI in adults and children (Table 1). The case 
definitions fit within the existing framework for pandemic 
early warning, use existing definitions for ease of adoption, 
and rely on physical examination findings that do not re-
quire laboratory or radiographic criteria. In addition, SARI 
definitions may capture a broad spectrum of severe influ-
enza-associated illness, including exacerbations of asthma, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and decompensat-
ed congestive heart failure, which may account for ≈75% 
of hospitalized influenza patients (16,20,21).
Sentinel Site Selection
Ideally, sites should represent a wide cross-section of 
ethnic and socioeconomic groups and should be in differ-
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ent climatic regions. Placement of sites in areas where the 
population denominator can be ascertained or estimated 
will facilitate incidence estimates. Ultimately, the choice 
of sentinel hospitals will often be based on practical issues 
such  as  human resources, communication infrastructure, 
and availability of specimen transport and testing. There is 
no ideal number of surveillance sites; the number chosen 
by a particular country will depend in part on sustainability 
and resources available.
Data Collection
Minimum data elements are outlined in Table 2. Data 
collected should be adequate for routine public health sur-
veillance and description of key epidemiologic features of 
disease. Data can be broadened to include clinical signs and 
symptoms, potential exposures, laboratory data, and thera-
pies.
Specimen Collection
Respiratory specimens should be collected early from 
all SARI patients, following established protocols (24). If 
resources do not allow collection from all patients, an unbi-
ased systematic sampling scheme should be established. To 
develop quality estimates of incidence and severity, data 
and specimens from all or most SARI patients from a few 
facilities would be preferred over a small sample of SARI 
patients from multiple facilities.
Because  seasonality,  attack  rates,  and  public  health 
priorities differ from country to country, there is no generic 
number of specimens to be collected by each site. The num-
ber must be determined by the primary surveillance objec-
tive (e.g., understanding of seasonality, risk factor analysis, 
or determination of clinical outcomes) and must represent 
climatic  and  geographic  regions.  For  example,  a  coun-
try with coastal, mountainous, and tropical regions may 
have different influenza activity in each region and may 
thus require more surveillance sites and increased speci-
men collection than neighbors or similarly sized countries. 
Therefore, the number of specimens collected must be ap-
proached on a case-by-case basis and depends on objec-
tives of a country, country-specific geographic and climatic 
issues, and public health priorities.
Integration into National Reporting Systems
In countries with established national disease report-
ing systems, such as the Integrated Disease Surveillance 
Reporting  system  used  in  Africa  (25),  sentinel  surveil-
lance for SARI can be incorporated into the existing sys-
tem. Because Integrated Disease Surveillance Reporting is 
generally a passive surveillance program, a few select sites 
should serve as embedded sentinel sites; intensive train-
ing and close follow-up should be conducted to ensure the 
quality of the reported data.
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Table 1. Influenza sentinel surveillance case definitions* 
Case Definition criteria
Influenza-like illness  ALL	OF	THE	FOLLOWING	
•	Sudden	onset	of	fever	>38°C,	AND	
•	Cough	or	sore	throat,	AND	
•	Absence	of	other	diagnoses	
Severe acute respiratory 
infection in persons >5 years 
of age 
ALL	OF	THE	FOLLOWING	
•	Sudden	onset	of	fever	>38°C,	AND	
•	Cough	or	sore	throat,	AND	
•	Shortness	of	breath	or	difficulty	breathing,	AND	
•	Requires	hospitalization	
Severe acute respiratory 
infection in persons <5 years 
of age 
EITHER
IMCI criteria for pneumonia 
Any	child	2	mo	to	5	y	of	age	with	cough	or	difficult	breathing	and:	
•	breathing	faster	than	60	breaths/min	(infants	<2	mo)	
•	breathing	faster	than	50	breaths/min	(2–12	mo)	
•	breathing	faster	than	40	breaths/min	(1–5	y)	
  OR  
IMCI criteria for severe pneumonia 
Any child 2 mo to 5 y of age with cough or difficult breathing and any of the following general danger 
signs:
•	unable	to	drink	or	breastfeed	
•	vomits	everything	
•	convulsions	
•	lethargic	or	unconscious	
•	chest	indrawing	or	stridor	in	a	calm	child	
	 AND	
Requires hospital admission 
*Surveillance guidelines use the existing World Health Organization (WHO) case definition for Influenza-like Illness (19), and incorporate WHO guidance 
to define severe acute respiratory infection in adults and children (9,18,19). IMCI, Integrated Management of Childhood Illness. POLICY	REVIEW
Outpatient Surveillance
The highest priority should be to collect data on SARI 
cases because they contain the most influenza-associated 
disability and premature death. However, if resources per-
mit, data collection at sentinel sites should be expanded to 
include ambulatory patients with ILI. Because the number 
of cases at ambulatory care sites is likely to be large, case 
counts would be aggregated, and clinical specimens and 
epidemiologic data would be collected from only a small 
sample of patients. Weekly case counts should be catego-
rized by age group according to well-studied age-range cat-
egories (6–23 months, 2–4 years, 5–17 years, 18–49 years, 
50–64 years, and >65 years) (26). Patients chosen to give 
detailed epidemiologic data and clinical specimens should 
be selected in as unbiased a manner as possible. The selec-
tion protocol must take into account local health-seeking 
behavior, such as differential use of evening and weekend 
clinics. Ideally, the weekly total number of patients seen by 
clinics would also be collected by age group to allow for 
proportion of ILI to be calculated. Rapid system expansion 
can compromise the quality of collected data; therefore, ILI 
surveillance should emphasize quality data collection from 
a few well-run sites.
Laboratory Testing
Clinical specimens should be collected from a high 
proportion of SARI patients and a systematic sample of ILI 
patients. These specimens can be processed in sentinel site 
laboratories, but further analyses may require their trans-
port to additional laboratories. Ideally, specimens would 
be tested for evidence of influenza viruses by reverse tran-
scription–PCR (RT-PCR). A subset of specimens should 
undergo viral culture and antigenic characterization. Sur-
veillance data should be submitted to WHO FluNet, and, 
if possible, national laboratories should work with a WHO 
Collaborating Center laboratory to submit sample virus iso-
lates for vaccine strain selection.
In countries where influenza spreads in seasonal epi-
demics, it may be adequate to collect less epidemiologic 
data and fewer specimens for laboratory testing by sam-
pling a smaller proportion of SARI patients during the non-
influenza season. Knowledge of SARI rates outside influ-
enza season will permit comparisons between peak season 
and baseline rates. Non–influenza season rates of SARI 
can also be monitored by public health authorities, because 
anomalies in SARI rates could represent outbreaks in need 
of investigation. However, high-quality, year-round data 
will be required for >1 season before assumptions can be 
made about seasonality in a region.
Nasal and nasopharyngeal specimens have a higher 
yield  for  influenza  virus  detection  in  ILI  cases  than  do 
oropharyngeal specimens (27). However, the relative sen-
sitivity of nasal versus oropharyngeal swabs to detect in-
fluenza virus infection in SARI cases is unknown. If both 
are collected, specimens can be placed in the same tube of 
viral transport media for processing. If SARI patients are 
intubated, endotracheal aspirates can also be used. Speci-
mens can be frozen at –70°C for storage and possible future 
assessment of other respiratory pathogens.
The sensitivity and specificity of any test for influen-
za will depend on the laboratory performing the test, the 
1274	 Emerging	Infectious	Diseases	•	www.cdc.gov/eid	•	Vol.	15,	No.	8,	August	2009
Table 2. Sample data collection from cases of severe acute 
respiratory infection and influenza-like illness* 
Recommended essential minimum data for SARI surveillance 
  General information 
	 	 •	Unique	identification	number	
	 	 •	Medical	record	number	
	 	 •	Name	(of	patient	and	parent’s	name,	if	a	minor)	
	 	 •	Date	of	birth	
	 	 •	Sex	
	 	 •	Address	
	 	 •	Date	of	onset	of	symptoms	
	 	 •	Date	of	collection	of	epidemiologic	data	
	 	 •	Suspected	novel	influenza	case	
	 	 •	Inpatient	or	outpatient	
  Clinical signs and symptoms 
	 	 •	Fever	>38°C	
	 	 •	Cough	
	 	 •	Sore	throat	
	 	 •	Shortness	of	breath/difficulty	breathing	
	 	 •	Other	clinical	danger	signs	(19,22,23)
  Type of specimen collected and date of collection 
	 	 •	Throat	swab	specimen,	date	of	collection	
	 	 •	Nasal	swab	specimen,	date	of	collection	
	 	 •	Other	specimen	(if	collected),	date	of	collection	
  Preexisting medical conditions 
	 	 •	Liver	disease	
	 	 •	Kidney	disease	
	 	 •	AIDS,	cancer,	or	other	immunocompromised	state	
	 	 •	Neuromuscular	dysfunction	
	 	 •	Diabetes	
	 	 •	Heart	disease	
	 	 •	Lung	disease	
	 	 •	Smoking	history	
Optional data collection for SARI surveillance 
  General information 
	 	 •	Diarrhea	
	 	 •	Encephalopathy	
  Exposure 
	 	 •	Occupation	of	patient	
	 	 •	Part	of	an	outbreak	investigation	
	 	 •	Contact	with	sick	or	dead	poultry	or	wild	birds	
	 	 •	Contact	with	friend	or	family	who	has	SARI	
	 	 •	Travel	in	an	area	known	to have endemic circulation of  
	 	 		avian	influenza	(H5N1)	
	 	 •	Other	high-risk	exposure	(e.g.,	eating	raw	or	undercooked
	 	 		poultry	products	in	an	area	of	influenza	virus	[H5N1]		
      circulation) 
	 Vaccine/treatment	history	
	 	 •	Vaccination	against	influenza	within	the	past	year	
	 	 •	Currently	taking	antiviral	medicine	
*SARI, severe acute respiratory infection; ILI, influenza-like illness. 	Influenza	Surveillance	Worldwide
quality of the clinical specimen, the manner in which the 
specimen is processed, and the type of specimen collected. 
Generally, RT-PCR testing of respiratory specimens is the 
most sensitive laboratory test for influenza virus, but it is 
relatively expensive and is not useful for antigenic charac-
terization (28). If the proper primers and probes are used, 
RT-PCR can determine influenza virus A subtype and can 
detect novel influenza virus A subtypes. Fluorescent anti-
body tests, although less expensive, are less sensitive and 
specific than RT-PCR (27). Rapid point-of-care tests are 
less sensitive and specific than RT-PCR or fluorescent an-
tibody tests and are not generally recommended for use by 
sentinel surveillance. Virus culture has been the diagnostic 
standard for identifying influenza virus. Culture sensitiv-
ity depends on proper specimen handling and the experi-
ence of the laboratory. Virus culture should be performed 
on at least a sample of specimens to provide material for 
antigenic determination and potential isolates for vaccine 
production.
Data Analysis and Reporting
Timely  analysis  and  reporting  of  surveillance  data 
will facilitate treatment decisions by clinicians and control 
measures by public health officials. It will also encourage 
continued reporting of cases by clinicians in the surveil-
lance  system.  Weekly  reports  of  clinical  and  laboratory 
confirmed case counts should be disseminated throughout 
the surveillance system to participating healthcare provid-
ers and all stakeholders during peak seasons. The frequen-
cy of reports and the extent to which they are disseminated 
will depend on data timeliness and public health priorities. 
Sentinel surveillance reporting mechanisms should use ex-
isting public health communications systems and augment 
other reporting mechanisms such as FluNet through WHO 
GISN (29).
Basic  analyses  of  surveillance  data  should  include 
weekly frequencies of SARI and laboratory-confirmed in-
fluenza cases as well as the proportion of tested patients, 
by age group, who are influenza virus positive. If possible, 
proportions of SARI and influenza cases per total of weekly 
sentinel hospital admissions should be reported. Reports 
with case frequencies and proportions during prior weeks 
and years will demonstrate trends over time. At least once 
annually, analyses of surveillance data to determine risk 
factors for disease should be reported. These reports should 
use collected data on concurrent conditions and population-
based rates, if these can be determined.
Understanding the epidemiology of severe influenza-
associated disease is essential for decisions related to vac-
cine recommendations. These data are prioritized in the 
guidelines because many developing countries have lim-
ited funds and competing healthcare priorities. However, 
data collected during SARI surveillance alone will be inad-
equate to describe aspects of influenza epidemiology such 
as transmission dynamics, costs, and occurrence of mild 
disease.
Evaluation and Quality Assurance
The usefulness of surveillance data will depend di-
rectly on the quality of the data; every system should have 
a quality assurance program. Quality indicators will reflect 
such attributes as system acceptability, timeliness, com-
pleteness, and representativeness of collected data. These 
attributes  should  be  assessed  routinely.  In  addition,  the 
system should undergo regular data audits and systematic 
field evaluation. In 2001, the Centers for Disease Control 
and  Prevention  published  comprehensive  guidelines  for 
the evaluation of public health surveillance systems (30). 
These guidelines serve as a template for sentinel surveil-
lance evaluation and quality recommendations. Several key 
quality indicators are recommended in the following sec-
tion and in Table 3.
Data Validity
Regular field evaluations and audits at a facility level 
must be a standard component of the system. This process 
can determine that cases are being counted appropriately, 
that reported cases meet the case definition, and that sam-
pling  procedures  are  being  used  uniformly  without  evi-
dence of bias. Data values recorded in the surveillance sys-
tem can be compared with standard chart-review values by 
a retrospective review of a sample of medical records. If a 
sampling procedure is used for specimen collection, audits 
can ensure that procedures are uniform and unbiased. Ad-
ditionally, audits can determine whether clinical specimens 
are being taken, stored, processed, tested (if appropriate), 
and shipped properly and in a timely manner from all those 
who meet sampling criteria.
Observance of expected trends in reporting and dis-
ease activity can provide an additional means of assessing 
data quality. Although it is not possible to define expected 
values for some parameters, such as the percentage of spec-
imens testing positive for influenza virus or the number of 
SARI cases occurring in a given facility, aberrations in the 
data over time or substantial differences between facilities 
can signal problems at a given site. Trends assessed may 
include number of cases reported by month, number of 
specimens submitted by month, percentage of influenza-
positive specimens, and number and percentage of SARI 
and ILI cases tested.
Timeliness
To be useful, collection and reporting of surveillance 
data must be timely. Timeliness of the following activities 
is appropriate for routine measurement as quality indicators 
for surveillance sites: data reporting, specimen shipment to 
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the laboratory for testing, receipt of specimens by the labo-
ratory, laboratory processing and testing of specimens, and 
reporting of laboratory results.
One way to quantify timeliness is to calculate the per-
centage of times that a site achieves targets for specific 
intervals, for example, the percentage of times that a site 
sends reports or specimens to the appropriate place within 
a specified time frame. A hypothetical system may choose 
as a goal that 80% of data reports be sent within 48 hours of 
the reporting deadline or that 80% of specimens be shipped 
within 48 hours of specimen collection. Likewise, for the 
laboratory, the percentage of samples that are tested and 
have final results within a target time frame can be calcu-
lated. Targets will depend on site-specific circumstances 
and public health priorities.
A similar quality metric that can be used is the cal-
culation of the average time to accomplish surveillance 
activities. For example, a hypothetical site that is chroni-
cally  late  in  sending  data  every  month  might  average 
several days between the deadline for receipt (the day of 
the week or month on which reports are due) and actual 
receipt of data. For laboratory specimen processing, the 
average number of days between receipt of specimens and 
the reporting of the results can be measured and followed 
similarly. Site time averages can be compared to identify 
sites that are underperforming and to target improvements. 
Either percentages of sites achieving timeliness targets or 
time lag averages can also be used as a quality metric to 
be followed over time.
Completeness
Indicators  of  completeness  can  be  determined  by 
analyzing  reported  data.  They  may  include  percentage 
of reports received from each site with complete data, 
percentage of total expected data reports received, and 
percentage of total expected cases that have specimens 
submitted to the laboratory (depends on sampling scheme 
devised for sites).
Pandemic Early Warning Systems and Monitoring
Emergence of new subtypes of influenza virus A in 
human populations is unusual and unlikely to be detected 
by a sentinel surveillance system, except by chance or if 
transmission is sustained. Control of a pandemic caused 
by the introduction of a new subtype of influenza virus A 
will require early detection and recognition of the event. 
Although sentinel surveillance as a stand-alone system may 
not accomplish this, it has value in establishing the infra-
structure necessary to respond to a pandemic. In addition 
to providing a basic understanding of the epidemiology of 
influenza transmission and risk, a routine reporting system 
would produce an infrastructure for reporting, specimen 
processing and testing, and data collection and analysis. 
It would make data interpretation more routine (and thus 
more manageable in the face of a pandemic emergency) 
and  drive  interest  in  influenza-associated  disease  and   
vaccination.
After a novel strain of influenza emerges, monitoring 
its course is necessary to determine whether cases are in-
creasing or decreasing, to detect changes in patient age dis-
tribution or other epidemiologic characteristics, to detect 
changes in mortality rates, and to monitor changes in sus-
ceptibility to antiviral agents. In the midst of an outbreak, 
national monitoring may not be necessary or feasible, and 
most, if not all, critical information can be gained from a 
few sentinel sites. Emergence of a new strain of influenza 
increases the data needs of health policy makers. Historical 
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Table 3. Influenza surveillance evaluation and recommended 
quality indicators* 
1. Timeliness 
  a.   Several time intervals are appropriate for routine  
    measurement as quality indicators. These include the  
    duration of time from 
    i.  Target date for data reporting from the sentinel site to the 
      next administrative level until the actual reporting date 
    ii.  Target date for data reporting from the next  
      administrative level to the national level until the actual  
      reporting date 
    iii. Date of specimen collection at facility until shipment to  
      laboratory 
    iv. Date of result availability in laboratory until date of report 
      to referring institution and physician 
    v. Date of receipt of specimen in the laboratory until result 
      availability 
  b.   Metrics. Two metrics can be used to reflect timeliness  
	 	 indicators:	
    i.  Percentage of time that a site achieves target for  
      timeliness 
    ii.  Average number of days for each interval over time for  
      each site 
2. Completeness 
  a.   Percentage of reports received from each site with complete 
    data 
  b.   Percentage of data reports that are received 
  c.  Percentage of reported cases that have specimens  
    collected 
3. Audit. Regular field evaluations and audits at facility level of a 
subset of medical records to ensure 
  a.   Cases are being counted appropriately and not being  
    underreported 
  b.   Reported cases fit the case definition 
  c.  Epidemiologic data are correctly and accurately abstracted 
  d.   Respiratory samples are being taken, stored, processed,  
    tested, and shipped properly and in a timely fashion from all
    those who meet sampling criteria 
  e.   Sampling procedures are being done uniformly without  
    evidence of bias 
4. Data to be followed and observed for aberrations over time 
	 a.		 Number	of	cases	reported	by	month	for	each	site	
	 b.		 Number	of	specimens	submitted by month for each site 
  c.  Percentage of specimens that are positive for influenza 
	 d.		 Number	and	percent	of	ILI	and	SARI	cases	tested	
*ILI, influenza-like illness; SARI, severe acute respiratory illness. 	Influenza	Surveillance	Worldwide
surveillance data for comparison can facilitate the under-
standing of answers to critical questions such as severity of 
the outbreak related to a new strain and its potential to ad-
versely affect healthcare delivery. An existing surveillance 
infrastructure also provides the platform needed to describe 
the clinical course of emerging pathogens, risk factors for 
severe outcomes, and effectiveness of control measures.
Conclusions
Surveillance  for  SARIs  can  provide  critical  under-
standing of the contribution of influenza infection to the 
global burden of disease, provide a platform for the study 
of  other  common  respiratory  pathogens,  and  strengthen 
public health infrastructure. Such a system should be a part 
of a routine surveillance program to provide data needed 
for allocation of scarce healthcare resources.
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